Richard, How does your overwhelming speed and precision means “defense wins” theory, account for force concentration? In star wars terms -- overwhelming the defensive system with MERV weapons. America was the prodigal son after Vietnam. And it learned something. That’s not the same as defense.
I think the conclusion that offensive land warfare is changing back towards the defense is way off. There are two reasons why your conclusion is incorrect:
First, the character of the conflict in Ukraine is unique. Russia has made the conscious decision to dig in and rack up the body count because Russia thinks that they can outlast Ukraine. Ukraine has no choice, because Ukraine doesn’t have the capability to offset Russia’s attritional strategy (as an aside, I agree with you that Ukraine should have had western weapon systems sooner before Russia could entrench their positions).
The air war in Ukraine is also unique: an aerial stalemate. Your statement implies that this will continue to happen in other wars, and there’s no guarantee that it will happen.
Would things in Ukraine change if the USAF joined Ukraine’s war effort? Absolutely. Air power can and will wreck defensive positions given enough time. See the coalition air campaign in Operation Desert Storm. The Iraqis intended to fight a war of attrition, but were so damaged after weeks of bombing that the troops assaulting right into the teeth of Iraqi defenses were able to push past those defenses with ease.
The Russian ground-based air defenses and the Russian Air Force are no match for the USAF. The character of the war changes overnight, and it won't be because of the ATGM or the drone.
Second, you’re basing your conclusions off of incomplete evidence. You’re only seeing the situations where ATGMs/Drones are successful. This is sampling/survivorship bias.
Ukraine and Russia aren’t likely to post videos of their failures, but they’ll gladly highlight their successes for propaganda purposes. We don’t know if their successes happen literally every time they launch a drone, or whether they’re successful one time out of a thousand.
We don’t know. Drawing conclusions from something that we don’t know is inappropriate.
I'll save my own conclusions on what Ukraine tells us about the nature of war for another time.
please add your own in “comments”. Well you asked:
John Singleton Mosby: Here because I like him.
Edmund Allenby
(a) 3rd Battle of Gaza; outflanked the Turks by taking Beersheba. deception, speed, surprise.
(b) Battle of Megiddo; secrecy, deception and speed. Use of air to ensure secrecy and to isolate the battlefield.
Both characterized by careful selection of the schwerpunkt, preparation using deception, tactical surprise, and logistics to support a speedy breakthrough. Should be in textbooks.
Alan Cunningham
Invason of Ethiopia from Kenya via Somaliland, 1941. British-led forces of 70,000 defeated Italian forces of 300,000, taking Addis Abbaba in 3 months. Average of 20 miles/day. No deception, not much secrecy, just speed and manoeuvre.
I can't help adding a personal note here: the campaign resulted in a large number of Italian POWs, many of whom were used to build roads in British East Africa. Italians build good roads; and on which, as a small boy 12 years later, I was driven on family expeditions.
Yamashita Tomoyuki, Tiger of Malaya.
Overran Malaya and Singapore in 10 weeks. Secrecy, speed, planning.
Heinz Guderian
Poland 1939 (though combined German-Soviet forces were superior)
Really a valuable and thoughtful essay. Thank you! So let me ask this: What is the future of offensive warfare? Is offensive warfare needed, for example, for the US to defenestrate Iran before it gets the bomb? I fear Iran will be a more-or-less permanent threat until it's put out of commission. Without offensive warfare (or internal overthrow, which we have not been able to engineer in over 40 years), how are we going to do that?
Richard, How does your overwhelming speed and precision means “defense wins” theory, account for force concentration? In star wars terms -- overwhelming the defensive system with MERV weapons. America was the prodigal son after Vietnam. And it learned something. That’s not the same as defense.
I think the conclusion that offensive land warfare is changing back towards the defense is way off. There are two reasons why your conclusion is incorrect:
First, the character of the conflict in Ukraine is unique. Russia has made the conscious decision to dig in and rack up the body count because Russia thinks that they can outlast Ukraine. Ukraine has no choice, because Ukraine doesn’t have the capability to offset Russia’s attritional strategy (as an aside, I agree with you that Ukraine should have had western weapon systems sooner before Russia could entrench their positions).
The air war in Ukraine is also unique: an aerial stalemate. Your statement implies that this will continue to happen in other wars, and there’s no guarantee that it will happen.
Would things in Ukraine change if the USAF joined Ukraine’s war effort? Absolutely. Air power can and will wreck defensive positions given enough time. See the coalition air campaign in Operation Desert Storm. The Iraqis intended to fight a war of attrition, but were so damaged after weeks of bombing that the troops assaulting right into the teeth of Iraqi defenses were able to push past those defenses with ease.
The Russian ground-based air defenses and the Russian Air Force are no match for the USAF. The character of the war changes overnight, and it won't be because of the ATGM or the drone.
Second, you’re basing your conclusions off of incomplete evidence. You’re only seeing the situations where ATGMs/Drones are successful. This is sampling/survivorship bias.
Ukraine and Russia aren’t likely to post videos of their failures, but they’ll gladly highlight their successes for propaganda purposes. We don’t know if their successes happen literally every time they launch a drone, or whether they’re successful one time out of a thousand.
We don’t know. Drawing conclusions from something that we don’t know is inappropriate.
I'll save my own conclusions on what Ukraine tells us about the nature of war for another time.
please add your own in “comments”. Well you asked:
John Singleton Mosby: Here because I like him.
Edmund Allenby
(a) 3rd Battle of Gaza; outflanked the Turks by taking Beersheba. deception, speed, surprise.
(b) Battle of Megiddo; secrecy, deception and speed. Use of air to ensure secrecy and to isolate the battlefield.
Both characterized by careful selection of the schwerpunkt, preparation using deception, tactical surprise, and logistics to support a speedy breakthrough. Should be in textbooks.
Alan Cunningham
Invason of Ethiopia from Kenya via Somaliland, 1941. British-led forces of 70,000 defeated Italian forces of 300,000, taking Addis Abbaba in 3 months. Average of 20 miles/day. No deception, not much secrecy, just speed and manoeuvre.
I can't help adding a personal note here: the campaign resulted in a large number of Italian POWs, many of whom were used to build roads in British East Africa. Italians build good roads; and on which, as a small boy 12 years later, I was driven on family expeditions.
Yamashita Tomoyuki, Tiger of Malaya.
Overran Malaya and Singapore in 10 weeks. Secrecy, speed, planning.
Heinz Guderian
Poland 1939 (though combined German-Soviet forces were superior)
Northern France, 1940.
Secrecy, speed, planning.
"Klotzen, Nicht Kleckern"
Really a valuable and thoughtful essay. Thank you! So let me ask this: What is the future of offensive warfare? Is offensive warfare needed, for example, for the US to defenestrate Iran before it gets the bomb? I fear Iran will be a more-or-less permanent threat until it's put out of commission. Without offensive warfare (or internal overthrow, which we have not been able to engineer in over 40 years), how are we going to do that?